I. INTRODUCTION
The strong stance taken by the United States against insider trading-an offense commonly referred to as "insider dealing" in foreign countries-has led these other jurisdictions to ban the offense as well. Until recently, the enforcement of insider trading violations was generally less However, the approaches to regulating insider trading and market abuse differ fundamentally across the Atlantic. In the United States, the offense is not statutorily defined. It is based on judicial and administrative interpretations of a broad securities antifraud statute and accompanying Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules, which is reminiscent of a common law approach. 5 The offense can be either criminal or civil, and because it is derived from an antifraud statute, has been interpreted by courts as requiring a showing of intent. 6 In the European Union, the offense of insider dealing was defined in a detailed directive known as the Market Abuse Directive ("MAD"), which has been implemented by the EU member states.
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Because MAD was a minimum directive, the United Kingdom treated it as a floor and implemented a stricter, so called "gold-plated" regime, which includes both criminal and civil penalties. 8 In addition to defining the offense statutorily, the U.K. and EU regimes differ from the U.S. antifraud framework in that the offense is premised on the concept of parity of information; there is no requirement that there be deceptive or misleading conduct. The parityof-information approach was urged by the SEC but explicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States as too broad in scope, given that Rule 10b-5, the rule allegedly violated, is grounded in fraud. 9 Under the parity-of-information approach, the focus is on the information possessed by the person doing the trading, not how he or she obtained it from his or one regime may not constitute a violation in the other. Given the inefficiency of overlapping and conflicting regulations, the growing globalization of markets, and the tendency to apply antifraud prohibitions extraterritorially, the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. and U.K. regimes should be evaluated with an eye to adopting a common approach. We conclude that the United States should enact a statutory rule of law based on the parity-of-information approach in the European Union, being sensitive, however, to immunizing trading activity based on information obtained through legitimate and socially valuable independent research.
